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‘Job hopping’ by engineers and scientists is widely heralded as an important channel for
knowledge spillovers within industries. Far less is known, however, about the actions firms
take to reduce the outward flow of knowledge through markets for skilled labor. This study
investigates the efficacy of a lever that has received little research attention: corporate reputations
for toughness in patent enforcement. Drawing on unique data on enforcement activity, intra-
industry inventor mobility, and patent citations in the U.S. semiconductor industry, we find that
a firm’s litigiousness significantly reduces spillovers otherwise anticipated from departures of
employee inventors, particularly when the hiring organizations are entrepreneurial ventures.
Surprisingly, the deterrent effects of patent enforcement are similar in magnitude for firms
located in California, a state characterized by open norms for knowledge trading, and firms
headquartered in other U.S. states. The study sheds new light on the strategic actions firms use
to prevent rivals from capturing value from their investments in human capital and research and
development. Copyright  2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The best way to send information is to wrap it
up in a person.
- J. Robert Oppenheimer (quoted in Stephan,
2006: 71)
The mobility of scientists and engineers in labor
markets provides a vibrant channel for knowledge
dissemination within industries (Arrow, 1962;
Stephan, 1996; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosen-
kopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal, Echambadi,
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Franco, and Sarkar, 2004; Klepper and Sleeper,
2005). In a survey of 100 fast-growing private
companies, for example, Bhide (1994) finds that 71
percent of the entrepreneurial founders commer-
cialized ideas they had encountered or discovered
while working at other companies. In an earlier
survey of research and development (R&D) man-
agers, Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987)
similarly report that hiring employees from rivals
enabled established firms to learn about external
technologies more efficiently and, in turn, hastened
the speed of imitation. Kerstetter (2000) further
documents celebrated employee raids designed to
gain access to competitors’ technologies, claiming
that technology companies often live by the adage,
‘If you have trouble with the competition, simply
raid its talent’(Kerstetter, 2000: 43).
For firms competing in knowledge-intensive
industries, however, departures of key talent can
Copyright  2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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deliver a double blow—the firms lose valuable
human capital and rivals stand to gain technologi-
cal know-how at their expense. This study investi-
gates the efficacy of a potential lever for reduc-
ing knowledge spillovers in markets for skilled
labor: building a corporate reputation for being
tough in the enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty (IP) rights.1 The past few decades have wit-
nessed an explosion of IP-related lawsuits in the
United States, particularly over patent-protected
technologies (Landes and Posner, 2003; Bessen
and Meurer, 2006). The surge in case filings is
simultaneously attributed to institutional reforms
in the mid-1980s that strengthened the bargain-
ing power of U.S. patent owners (Jaffe, 2000;
Gallini, 2002) and intensified efforts by firms to
capture value from innovation-related investments
(Somaya, 2003). Are there potential reputational
effects of these litigious acts, and what are the
implications for spillovers via employee depar-
tures? Extant literature is silent on this issue, leav-
ing a gap that we propose to fill in this study.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some firms
are indeed willing to aggressively protect their
exclusionary rights to technological know-how,
often in direct response to unanticipated employee
exits. National Semiconductor, for instance, filed
a lawsuit in 1984 against Linear Technology, a
start-up founded by former employees to com-
mercialize improved chip technologies they had
discovered while working at National. In justify-
ing the decision, National’s chief executive offi-
cer (CEO) at the time noted that ‘it might easily
cost $60 million to develop a new semiconductor
technology.. . . With investments of such magni-
tude at stake today, you do get sensitive’ (Larson,
1984: 1). To stem a similar tide of employee defec-
tions to start-ups in the 1980s, Intel’s CEO report-
edly issued a blanket order to his general counsel
to file two IP lawsuits per quarter to dissuade
engineers from ‘walking out the door’ with pro-
prietary technologies (Jackson, 1997: 214). More
recently, Intel sued Broadcom in a tug-of-war
over engineering talent, voicing concerns about
a ‘systematic effort to recruit [Intel] employees’
(Hachman, 2000).2 As part of the dispute, Intel
1 For brevity, we use the term ‘IP enforcement’ hereafter to refer
to enforcement of intellectual property rights.
2 This dispute is particularly interesting since Intel provided pre-
IPO venture financing and technical assistance to Broadcom in
hopes of creating complementarities in their product lines (AP
Newswire, 2000).
accused Broadcom—and a company Broadcom
was in the process of acquiring—of infringing on
five Intel patents, threatening to halt the manufac-
ture and sale of core products at both companies.
The case settled quickly on terms favorable to Intel
(AP Newswire, 2000).
To systematically investigate the implications of
such litigiousness for mobility-driven spillovers,
we draw upon the strategy and economics literature
on corporate reputations (Kreps and Wilson, 1982;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Weigelt and Camerer,
1988; Shamsie, 2003). Viewing IP enforcement
as a general ‘reputation-building’ strategy (rather
than a particular tactic employed against a partic-
ular litigant or patent), we develop three hypothe-
ses. First, we predict that a firm’s reputation for
toughness will significantly reduce the spillovers
otherwise anticipated from employee departures to
rivals. Second, we predict that tough reputations
will be particularly powerful in curbing spillovers
to ‘entrepreneurial firms’ (i.e., organizations that
are young, small, or private), given their lesser
ability to fund and withstand an IP-related dispute.
Similarly, we expect that entrepreneurial firms’
threats of litigious action will be perceived as
less credible than the threats of established firms,
thus eroding the reputation effects associated with
IP rights enforcement. Finally, we predict that IP
toughness will be less effectual as a spillover-
reduction mechanism for California-based com-
panies because of the unusually strong norms of
informal knowledge trading and reciprocity char-
acterizing innovative activity in that state (Saxe-
nian, 1994; Gilson, 1999).
We test these predictions in the U.S. semicon-
ductor industry—a canonical setting used in prior
studies to illustrate the technological spillovers
associated with the firm-to-firm mobility of engi-
neers and scientists (Angel, 1989; Almeida and
Kogut, 1999). We integrate hand collected data
on patent litigation histories with broader patterns
of inventor mobility and patent citation behavior
in the industry in the 1973–2003 period. Build-
ing cumulatively on prior studies on ‘learning-
by-hiring’ in the semiconductor industry (e.g.,
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Almeida, Dokko,
and Rosenkopf, 2003; Song, Almeida, and Wu,
2003), we estimate spillovers using patent cita-
tions as a proxy. More specifically, we estimate the
extent to which a firm’s reputation for IP toughness
(litigiousness about protecting intellectual prop-
erty) reduces the extent of spillovers that otherwise
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would be predicted when employees leave to work
at other firms within the industry.
This study contributes to three literature streams.
The first is research on knowledge spillovers
through employee mobility, where Agarwal,
Audretsch, and Sarkar (2007) call for examina-
tion of the boundary conditions and constraints on
interorganizational transfers of knowledge through
employee mobility and entrepreneurship. Our study
theorizes and provides evidence of the negative
impact of reputations for IP toughness on interor-
ganizational knowledge flows due to employee
mobility. Second, our study builds on and extends
research on reputation effects in corporate strategy.
Just as firms can enhance performance by devel-
oping reputations for being ‘good’ (see Roberts
and Dowling, 2002), so can they garner strate-
gic advantages by developing reputations for being
tough in IP enforcement. Finally, for the litera-
ture on IP litigation (Somaya, 2003; Lanjouw and
Schankerman, 2004), our study raises the possibil-
ity that litigious action confers reputation effects
that shape spillovers in markets for skilled labor,
thus revealing a source of asymmetry between liti-
gating parties that has received little prior atten-
tion. In this context, our study also highlights
the differential effects of IP rights enforcement
on start-ups, which is relevant for policies aimed
at fostering entrepreneurial activity and economic
growth.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Knowledge spillovers via employee mobility
According to the knowledge-based view of the
firm, privately held knowledge is an important
source of competitive heterogeneity (Grant, 1996;
Spender, 1996; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).
A rich body of research has focused on firms
existing for the acquisition and creation of orga-
nizational knowledge (Griliches, 1979; Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). Procedures, norms, rules, and
forms serve as repositories of such information
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988;
March, 1991) and potentially give a firm a com-
petitive advantage, given the difficulty other firms
encounter in the replication and imitation of such
‘tacit’ knowledge.
Importantly, organizational investment in
R&D—a primary method of new knowledge cre-
ation—often occurs through imparting human cap-
ital to employees. Simon (1991) emphasized that
learning occurs in the minds of individuals: orga-
nizations learn either by their employees learning
or by hiring new employees with new knowl-
edge. The symbiotic relationship between orga-
nizational and individual knowledge implies that
firms that invest in the knowledge-creating activ-
ities of their employees also run the risk of los-
ing this value-creating asset. Unlike other value-
generating resources, knowledge embedded in
employees is a precarious possession—individuals
can quit at any time (Coff, 1997). In keep-
ing with Simon’s (1991) identification of learn-
ing through hiring, scholars have found strong
support for knowledge spillovers or transfer via
employee mobility (Bhide, 1994; Agrawal, Cock-
burn, and McHale, 2006., Almeida and Kogut,
1999; Oettl and Agrawal, 2008; Phillips, 2002;
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal et al.,
2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). While the
early literature on agglomeration and regional eco-
nomics focused on localization as a primary mech-
anism that fosters knowledge spillovers, recent
work has drawn attention to the role of employee
mobility in overcoming ‘local search’ (Rosenkopf
and Almeida, 2003). Saxenian (1994) and Klep-
per (2002) attribute the development of regional
economies to high levels of knowledge spillovers
via employee mobility/entrepreneurship. Indeed,
Gilson (1999) argues that the success of firms
located in the Silicon Valley of California is largely
attributable to the reluctance of California courts
to enforce noncompete clauses, which amplified
the effects of employee mobility on knowledge
diffusion.
The above literature, in general, has focused
on the benefits for the recipient firm of acquir-
ing knowledge by hiring employees from rivals.3
Almeida and Kogut (1999), Rosenkopf and
Almeida (2003), and Song et al. (2003), for
instance, provide empirical evidence of the benefits
for innovation (as measured by patenting activity)
for semiconductor firms that hire employees from
other firms within the industry. Scholars have also
3 As in prior studies (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003), here a
recipient firm is a potential receiver of technological knowledge
from another firm, and a source firm is a potential supplier of
technological knowledge to others. Firms can assume both roles.
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examined whether employee mobility engenders
explorative or exploitative search, and how firms
should optimally organize themselves for knowl-
edge transfer benefits (Madsen, Mosakowski, and
Zaheer, 2003; Tzabbar, Silverman, and Aharonson,
2006). Hiring experienced engineers and scientists
from established firms is particularly important for
entrepreneurial companies (Angel, 1989; Almeida
et al., 2003), and the related research on spin-
outs—new ventures founded by mobile employ-
ees—also extols the benefits of inherited knowl-
edge (Agarwal et al. 2004; Klepper and Sleeper
2005).
Less attention, however, has been given to
the potential adverse effects on source firms,
particularly when recipient firms are actual
or potential competitors in the same industry.
Although source firms may receive benefits
when former employees join noncompeting firms
(Somaya, Williamson, and Lorinkova, 2007),
employees’ joining rival firms may impose a
negative externality: a source firm stands to lose
valuable resources when employees leave and
further, such departures potentially heighten the
capabilities of rivals, to the detriment of the
source firm’s own competitive advantage. Some
scholars have examined contractual solutions to the
mobility-induced spillover problem, such as high
wages, stock options, and noncompete clauses in
employment contracts (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983;
Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer, 2006; Marx,
Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009). However, labor
economists have noted that such mechanisms
may not solve the problem entirely, given
positive transaction costs in the writing and
enforcements of employment contracts (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1998; 1999; Kim and Marschke,
2005). Franco and Filson (2006) show that
employees with entrepreneurial aspirations may
not value monetary rewards alone, and Anton
and Yao (1995) discuss why expropriation hazards
in labor markets are imperfectly solved through
contracts and incentives. Further, noncompete
agreements are difficult to enforce in several states,
including California, where many technology-
intensive companies are based.
Alternatively, firms may adapt their IP strate-
gies in response to concerns about leakage in
labor markets. Kim and Marschke (2005) raise the
intriguing possibility that, when confronted with
high turnover among skilled employees, firms seek
to protect a larger share of their inventions with
patents, which are easier to enforce than trade
secrets and noncompete agreements.4 Left unan-
swered by their study, however, is whether firms
gain reputation benefits through patent enforce-
ment. Thus, there is a need to pay more atten-
tion to the issue of whether firms adopt spe-
cific strategies to combat knowledge spillovers via
employee mobility, and their efficacy in doing so.
We are particularly interested in whether variation
in firms’ propensity to litigate to protect intellec-
tual property—and their resultant reputations for
toughness—affects the spillovers anticipated when
employees leave.
Review of the literature on reputations
and firm performance
Corporate reputations have long been cast as strate-
gic assets. Scholars in economics, sociology, and
strategy have documented the beneficial effects of
building a positive reputation, or ‘brand capital,’
on performance (Shapiro, 1983; Podolny, 1993;
Rao, 1994; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Sham-
sie, 2003). Being known as a high-quality pro-
ducer yields a premium (Shapiro, 1983), particu-
larly under conditions of uncertainty, when past
reputation and high status can signal continued
excellence (Spence, 1974; Podolny, 1993). Simi-
larly, corporations admired by peers ‘outperform’
less reputable firms (Roberts and Dowling, 2002).
While this recent work focuses on the returns
from being ‘good,’ an older literature in industrial
economics highlights the strategic advantages of
being ‘tough,’ particularly in the context of entry
deterrence and predatory pricing (Kreps and Wil-
son, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Weigelt
and Camerer, 1988). In reviewing this literature,
Carlton and Perloff (2005) discuss the two condi-
tions under which reputation-building investments
can yield strategic benefit. First, the investing orga-
nization must have an advantage over its rivals.
4 Although trade secrets help protect against leakage of business-
proprietary information (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Han-
nah, 2005), proving theft can be difficult and poses a disclo-
sure paradox: to establish theft, potential plaintiffs must reveal
valuable private information, making them reluctant to file
suit. In contrast, patent-protected inventions are already public.
Patents also confer a strategic advantage over trade secrets when
improvements are easy to reverse engineer: while independent
invention (through reverse engineering or other means) is a legal
defense against trade secret theft allegations, reverse engineer-
ing of patented technologies can lead to liability for infringement
(Moore, Michel, and Lupo, 1999).
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Second, it must demonstrate a credible commit-
ment to following through with the reputational
strategy, regardless of a rival’s actions.
Asymmetry between firms helps ensure that
these two conditions are met. Imperfect informa-
tion can result in an existing organization success-
fully engaging in predation or entry deterrence if
rivals or potential entrants are uncertain regard-
ing its options, motivation, or behavior (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1982). Given imperfect information,
rival firms are likely to infer a focal firm’s cur-
rent and future behavior from its past behavior.
The focal firm, in such a situation, can credibly
commit by investing in building a reputation for
toughness—even if the cost of doing so in one
particular strategic interaction exceeds the benefits
in that instance—since the expected benefits of
such a reputation include inhibiting competition by
deterring other firms’ entry (Scherer, 1980; Kreps
and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982).
By engaging in costly actions, such as estab-
lishing a history of predatory pricing or raising
rival’s costs through advertising campaigns, firms
can build a reputation for toughness that permits
them to earn superior rents (Carlton and Perloff,
2005). The costliness of the action helps ensure
a ‘separating equilibrium.’ If ‘passive’ actors can
easily mimic the behavior of ‘tough’ actors in
the search for performance enhancements, others
will find it difficult to predict future action on the
basis of past behavior; in turn, a ‘pooling equilib-
rium’ arises, and the signaling function of strate-
gic action unravels (Spence, 1974; Weigelt and
Camerer, 1988). Finally, to shape the expectations
of third parties, an action must also be observable
(as are pricing actions, marketing campaigns, and
patent lawsuits).
Reputations for IP toughness and knowledge
spillovers via employee mobility
Insights from the models cited above extend to
strategic actions taken to reduce the risk that
technological know-how is expropriated through
employee mobility. When employees discover a
novel, nonobvious, and useful invention during
work, legal rights to patents based on those dis-
coveries are assigned (with rare exception) to
their employers (Merges, 1999).5 Employees who
5 Fisk (1998) describes the shift in the early 1900s from a shop
rights regime (employees owned patents that were licensed to
leave to join or establish other companies may
not have legal rights to make, use, or build
upon patented technologies owned by their former
employers unless explicit permission to do so has
been granted through license agreements. Even if
an ex-employee (and his/her new employer) tries
to ‘design around’ prior patents, the success of
such solutions can be costly to ascertain. As legal
scholars note, it is difficult to determine whether
changes to and ‘designs-around’ a patented device
will be deemed infringement unless a case has been
adjudicated (Moore et al., 1999). Given these own-
ership rights and legal ambiguities, patents may
help firms not only to safeguard against unautho-
rized use of knowledge by imitators and rivals, but
also to protect against misappropriation by firm
insiders (Kim and Marschke, 2005).
Although firms that engage in costly R&D
investments often patent their innovations to secure
intellectual property rights in the products of
these investments (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al.,
1987), patents confer a right, but not an obli-
gation, to sue others for alleged infringement.6
The cost of enforcing patents is several orders
of magnitude larger than the cost of acquiring
them. Lemley (2001), for example, estimates that
the cost of obtaining a typical U.S. patent, inclu-
sive of filing and attorney fees, is approximately
$20,000. Meanwhile, the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA, 2007) estimate
of litigation costs for a patent dispute of aver-
age complexity hovers between $3 and $5 million.
Patent enforcement is therefore a particularly use-
ful lever for firms seeking to build reputations
for being tough about the unauthorized use of
their proprietary technologies. The costliness of the
employers) to a pre-invention assignment regime (employees
signed over invention rights ex ante as an employment con-
tract condition). According to Fisk, ‘Once employer lawyers
disabused judges of the inventor-hero image in favor of the mod-
ern vision of inventive employees working in a big, employer-
financed laboratory, the law began to change’ (Fisk, 1998: 1198).
Modern U.S. courts continue to uphold an employer’s inter-
est in ‘protecting confidential information, trade secrets, and,
more generally, its time and expenditures in training and impart-
ing skills and knowledge to its paid work force’ (Fisk, 1998:
1196n281).
6 We refer readers to Moore et al. (1999) and Lanjouw and
Schankerman (2004) for detailed discussions regarding patent
rights and enforcement procedures. It is important to recognize,
however, that patent rights are exclusionary, not affirmative: a
patent, (if valid) grants a patentee a time-limited right to exclude
others from use of the patented invention; it does not grant
the patentee the right to use the patented invention if such use
infringes upon others’ rights.
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activity has an important sorting function. More-
over, the press frequently monitors patent lawsuits,
which makes them widely observable. Employ-
ees and their potential hirers can therefore gauge
which firms are likely to adopt a more protec-
tive stance against unauthorized uses of proprietary
technologies.
Thus, corporate reputations for patent litigious-
ness should moderate the extent to which propri-
etary technology disseminates through employee
exits. Consistently with the first condition for a
reputation-building strategy (Carlton and Perloff,
2005), the source firm has an advantage over its
rival by virtue of its ownership of patents on
the innovation—with the ownership of IP being
analogous to cost advantage in the predation/entry
deterrence models. If the source firm has addition-
ally invested in the costly and observable activity
of engaging in IP litigation, departed employees
and a recipient (hiring) firm will perceive a cred-
ible threat, so the second condition for the strat-
egy to be successful is met (Carlton and Perloff,
2005). Absent full information on the source firm’s
actions, its ex-employees and the hiring organi-
zation will use its past behavior to make infer-
ences about future actions to curb unauthorized
use of proprietary know-how and technologies.
In turn, incentives to misappropriate technologies
from firms perceived as tough will be diminished.
We note that it is not necessary for a firm
to actively pursue IP litigation against all, or
even many, of its ex-employees. Again reflecting
market-entry deterrence models (Scherer, 1980),
the IP toughness model does not focus on what
patents a firm defends or which firms it targets,
but rather focuses on whether it builds an overall
reputation for toughness. Even if the costs of being
litigious in a particular dispute outweigh the bene-
fits, the deterrence of future knowledge spillovers
can justify the investment. This logic also sug-
gests that reputations can be built through litigious
actions that are not specifically directed against
mobility-driven leakage. If a former employer has
invested in prior litigation to bar direct product
market rivals from unauthorized use of its patent-
protected technologies, hiring organizations and
employees may perceive that the firm is tough
rather than passive in protecting its IP.7 In line
7 For example, in the 1980s, Intel invested heavily in patent
enforcement against its main product market rival, Advanced
with the strategic deterrence literature, these repu-
tations can shape others’ behavior irrespective of
whether action is realized in a particular instance.
Accordingly, we make the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1: Reputations for IP toughness will
reduce the spillovers otherwise anticipated from
intra-industry inventor mobility.
Our second set of predictions concerns whether
IP toughness is a more efficacious mechanism for
deterring employee mobility–related spillovers for
entrepreneurial or established firms, given differ-
ences between them regarding access to finan-
cial or managerial resources. Extant research typ-
ically differentiates between entrepreneurial and
established firms on the basis of three related,
yet conceptually distinct, firm-level characteristics:
(a) access to public equity markets (i.e., private
ownership status), (b) size, and (c) age. Each of
these characteristics can affect the organizational
and financial burdens associated with IP litiga-
tion, thus shaping firm behavior toward poten-
tial conflict. Since these attributes tend to be
highly correlated with one another, we refer to
private/small/young firms collectively as ‘entre-
preneurial’ and distinguish them from their more
‘established’ counterparts.
If recipient firms are differentially affected by
the potential costs and disruptions of an IP-related
dispute, we should expect heterogeneous responses
to reputations for IP toughness. The law and eco-
nomics literature (e.g., Lerner 1995; Lanjouw and
Lerner, 2001) suggests that, vis-à-vis established
firms, entrepreneurial firms are at a disadvantage
in funding or withstanding lawsuits and will take
care to avoid conflict when hiring employees from
firms with reputations for IP toughness. Lerner
(1995) finds evidence supportive of this prediction
by examining the patent filings of new biotechnol-
ogy firms with various levels of litigation costs: he
shows that firms with high litigation costs (firms
with fewer financial resources and low litigation
experience) are more likely to avoid patenting in
subclasses in which there have been other court-
ordered awards to patent holders, particularly when
Micro Devices (AMD) (Jackson, 1997). Even though the law-
suits against AMD did not pertain to employee exits, these
actions informed perceptions about the toughness of Intel.
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low-litigation-cost firms have secured prior own-
ership stakes in those areas.8
Turning to specific characteristics associated
with entrepreneurial firms, we note that imper-
fections in capital markets can disproportionately
affect the ability of firms to finance costly liti-
gation (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001). Relative to
public companies, private firms are at a disad-
vantage when raising funds to defend against
claims of infringement by either issuing additional
equity to investors or securing loans. As Nesheim
(2000) notes, ‘Venture capitalists hate investing in
a start-up that gets bogged down in lawsuits that
drain precious time and cash resources’ (Nesheim,
2000: 33).
Further, IP legal disputes can be particularly
deleterious for small firms. Small firms are more
likely than large ones to forgo certain research
opportunities because of the potential disruption
and legal disputes (Koen, 1991) associated with
them. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) suggest
that small firms are disproportionately handicapped
when settling IP-related disputes because their
patent portfolios are smaller than those of larger
firms, which puts them at a bargaining disadvan-
tage when ‘trading’ IP rights. Small firms also are
less likely than larger firms to have in-house legal
counsel (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Schankerman,
2004), which puts them at a cost disadvantage
when managing IP disputes.
Finally, the opportunity costs of becoming
embroiled in an IP-related lawsuit should loom
particularly large for nascent organizations. Little
prior research and quantitative evidence support
this claim, yet the conjecture resonates with qual-
itative accounts of IP attorneys and entrepreneurs.
Following an IP lawsuit filed by IBM, the vice
president of a start-up founded by ex-IBM employ-
ees (Cybernex Corp) reported that the lawsuit
‘scare[d] off new recruits, customers, suppliers,
and, most important, investors’ (Larson, 1984: 2).
8 Related work in law and economics examines how costly
regulations or legal expenses differentially affect firms. In an
influential early study, Bartel and Thomas (1987) argue that ‘if
the cost burden of certain regulations falls heavily on one group
of firms and lightly on a second group, then an indirect effect
of these regulations is to provide cost advantage to the second
group of firms’ (Bartel and Thomas, 1987: 239). The authors
find that ‘compliance asymmetries’ in the costs of meeting
occupational safety and environmental regulations favor large
firms over smaller ones. This work, which is not commonly cited
in strategy research, is informative as to how costly activities
may have heterogeneous effects on firm behavior and thus, on
competitive advantage.
In interviews with Silicon Valley attorneys, Lar-
son cites heightened concerns that entrepreneurs
‘will be absorbed at the most crucial time in the
start-up’s history’—the early stages of the firm’s
development—and concludes that the ‘founders’
time is one of the clearest and most costly victims
of [IP] suits’ (1984: 2). Further, younger firms may
lack the organizational experience and capabilities
to deal with IP litigation.
In combination, these arguments suggest that
entrepreneurial—private, small, or young firms—
are disadvantaged in funding and withstanding IP-
related disputes relative to public, large, or older
firms. Assuming that entrepreneurial firms take
added precautions to avoid legal conflict when
hiring employees from litigious firms, we offer the
following prediction:
Hypothesis 2a: Reputations for IP toughness
will reduce the spillovers anticipated from intra-
industry inventor mobility more for entre-
preneurial recipient firms than for established
recipient firms.
The characteristics of entrepreneurial firms that
disadvantage them as hiring organizations in IP-
related conflicts may similarly undermine their
ability to establish credible reputations for IP
toughness. As discussed above, for a reputation
to be built, others must perceive prior action as
informative about future behavior. Even if an
entrepreneurial firm initiates a patent lawsuit (i.e.,
it engages in costly and observable action), its
relative lack of resources may lead others to dis-
count the probability that it will do so again in the
future. Thus, building on the arguments set forth
in Hypothesis 2a above,
Hypothesis 2b: Reputations for IP toughness
will reduce the spillovers anticipated from intra-
industry inventor mobility less for entre-
preneurial source firms than for established
source firms.
The prevailing business environment may also
influence the effects of a tough IP reputation on
rival firm behavior. Saxenian (1994) attributes the
greater continuing success of California’s Sili-
con Valley firms relative to New England’s Route
128 firms to a unique configuration of West
Coast culture, detachment from traditional hierar-
chical business practices, and norms established
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by early major players such as Hewlett-Packard.
Saxenian (1994) argues that firms like Hewlett-
Packard encouraged employees to pursue outside
entrepreneurial activities, while their East Coast
counterparts, such as Digital Equipment, took
a defensive approach. Additionally, institutional
factors in California also encourage knowledge
spillovers in labor markets, as the state typically
does not enforce noncompete covenants in employ-
ment (Gilson, 1999; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003).
These factors are credited with creating a unique
environment in the state that is characterized by
extensive job-hopping and fluid communication of
technical information and ‘best practices’ across
firm boundaries (Rogers and Larsen, 1984; von
Hippel, 1987; Appleyard, 1996; Saxenian, 1994).
A ‘stylized fact’ emerging from these studies is
that information technology firms based in Silicon
Valley and elsewhere in California simultaneously
face rapid absorption by other firms of informa-
tion and know-how pertaining to inventions and
unusually high turnover among skilled employees
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Kim and Marschke,
2005; Fallick et al., 2006). In such an institutional
and business environment, the efficacy of firm-
level strategies targeted at reducing spillovers is
likely to be weak. Consequently, California-based
employers may find signaling toughness via rep-
utations built on prior litigious activity difficult,
even if they engage in such behavior. Accordingly,
we predict:
Hypothesis 3: Reputations for IP toughness will
reduce the spillovers anticipated from intra-
industry inventor mobility less for California-




Industry context and data description
The context of our study is the U.S. semiconduc-
tor industry. The industry exhibits high employee
mobility, and prior studies document that such
mobility facilitates interfirm transfer of technolog-
ical knowledge (e.g., Almeida and Kogut, 1999;
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). We use these prior
empirical studies, which trace patterns of citations
revealed in patent documents, to construct a base-
line model and to benchmark our results. Firms
in this industry also have a high propensity to file
patents (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and appear to
be increasingly active in enforcing those patents
(Ziedonis, 2003; Bessen and Meurer, 2006).
Empirically, we trace the innovative activities of
447 U.S. semiconductor firms over the 1973–2003
period. We track firm founding and litigation
events over the period 1973–2001, and patenting
activities and citations over the period 1973–2003.
We distinguish between when a firm is a potential
source of knowledge spillovers and when it is a
potential recipient of such knowledge. For simplic-
ity, we refer to the firms in their role as ‘source’ (or
‘cited’) and ‘recipient’ (or ‘citing’) firms, respec-
tively. As noted earlier, our dyad-level analysis
allows source firms to play dual roles as recipients
of talent from other industry incumbents.
The source firm sample (n = 136) is drawn
from a comprehensive list of U.S. firms that
(a) compete primarily in the semiconductor indus-
try and (b) were publicly traded for at least one
year during the period 1973–1995. Importantly,
the sample does not include ‘patent predators,’
which merely buy patents and practice extortion
by threatening litigation; none of the source firms
listed Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code
6797 (patent owners and lessors) as their primary
line of business. In 2000, the source firms in our
sample collectively generated over $88 billion in
annual revenues and spent $12 billion on R&D.
For each source firm, we observe any initiation of
patent infringement lawsuits in U.S. courts dur-
ing 1973–2001 using data in Ziedonis (2003).
These data merge case filings reported in legal
databases (e.g., Litalert by Derwent) with supple-
mental information reported in archival 10-K fil-
ings, news articles, and press releases. As a result,
we are able to determine when a firm actually
files a patent infringement lawsuit against a third
party, not just whether patents awarded to that firm
are involved in litigation, as is common practice
(e.g., Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Somaya,
2003).9 Importantly, the time-varying data for each
firm’s IP toughness permit us to observe patent lit-
igation histories over the entire lifespan of these
companies (i.e., post-founding), thus enabling us
to test Hypothesis 2b (on the differential effects of
9 The involvement of patents assigned to a given firm in a
litigated dispute does not necessarily mean that the original
assignee (firm) is taking action to enforce its legal rights; others
could be challenging the validity of those patents, or the patents
could have been sold to third parties (Ziedonis, 2003).
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IP toughness among entrepreneurial vs. established
source firms).
To assemble a larger pool of potential recipient
firms, we add to source firms (a) 454 venture-
backed semiconductor firms founded during 1980–
2001, using data provided by VentureOne, and
(b) 59 firms in the industry (SIC 3674) that went
public after 1995, identified from Compustat.
Including recent entrants and start-ups in the recip-
ient pool is particularly useful for our tests of
Hypothesis 2a (regarding heterogeneous effects of
IP toughness among entrepreneurial vs. established
recipient firms).
Since knowledge flows and mobility events are
identified in our study with patent data, we require
that source and recipient firms receive at least
one U.S. patent. This restriction eliminates seven
source firms, 188 start-ups, and seven recent public
entrants. The disproportionate omission of start-
ups is not surprising. Many start-ups in the larger
sample fail or are acquired at very young ages,
thus reducing the likelihood of observing patent
awards for these firms.10 The final sample therefore
includes 129 source firms, 266 private start-ups,
and 52 recent public entrants. For the combined
set of 447 firms, we integrate financial and found-
ing year data from Compustat, Hoover’s Business
Directories, and VentureOne; patent data from Del-
phion and the National University of Singapore;
information on alliances and cross-licensing activ-
ities from SDC Platinum and searches of news
articles and press releases in Lexis-Nexis and Fac-
tiva; and patent litigation histories (for source
firms) from Ziedonis (2003). Between 1973 and
2003, sample firms collectively received 50,491
patents, of which 38,689 were awarded to the sub-
set of source firms for which we observe litigation
behavior.
Variable definition
Dependent variable: citation count
The dependent variable is the count of citations
made by patents of a recipient firm to patents
of a source firm in a given year. More (fewer)
such citations are interpreted as evidence of higher
(lower) knowledge spillovers. In keeping with
prior research, we acknowledge that while patent
10 Of the patents in our sample, 92 percent are generated by
established firms.
citations are the best available option for large-
scale studies, they are nonetheless a noisy proxy
for knowledge diffusion (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and
Henderson, 1993; Almeida and Kogut, 1999;
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Alcacer and Git-
tleman, 2006; Deng, 2008). Alcacer and Gittleman
(2006) show that government examiners also add
citations to patent documents, thus calling into
question whether applicants truly ‘know’ about
technologies embedded in other patents they cite.
However, Lampe (2007) argues and shows that
firms in the semiconductor industry (and their
inventors) may have strategic motives for omitting
citations to patents that are technologically close.11
In such instances, citations added by examiners
usefully reveal otherwise unobservable technologi-
cal linkages. In light of these unresolved controver-
sies, we report robustness checks that both include
and omit examiner-added citations.
Although knowledge diffusion is possible after
a firm leaves a market (Hoetker and Agarwal,
2007), we assume that reputation effects cease
to exist when a source firm exits and remove
exited source firms from future dyad-year observa-
tions. We make additional adjustments for acqui-
sitions. If one firm in the sample acquires another,
the acquired firm exits the sample in the year
of acquisition, and its patents are added to the
acquirer’s portfolio from that point forward. Our
final database is an unbalanced panel with 506,374
unique dyad years and 74,624 citations to source
firms. Self-citations and citations made by firms
outside the focal sample are not included.
Main independent variables
Four explanatory variables are of central interest
in our study. The first variable, mobility, captures
11 Legal requirements aside, a firm faces conflicting strategic
incentives when citing other patents in an application. By failing
to cite, the firm risks losing its own patent if subsequently
challenged with omitting ‘prior art’ that establishes obviousness
or lack of novelty. The effects of citations on the risk that others
will sue the patentee for infringement are more ambiguous.
On the one hand, prior art citations may represent an attempt
to ‘invent around’ an earlier patent to avoid infringement. As
noted earlier, however, it can be difficult and costly to determine
whether such a solution is noninfringing (Moore et al., 1999).
On the other hand, in the event of an infringement suit, such
citations could be used as evidence that the citing party knew
about the patented invention but continued without a license,
thus fueling concerns that damages could be enhanced through
a verdict of willful infringement. Lampe (2007) discusses these
trade-offs in more detail.
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the movement of inventively productive employees
from a source firm to a potential recipient. The
second variable, litigiousness, is our proxy for a
reputation for toughness in patent enforcement. For
the last two hypotheses, we constructed indicator
variables—entrepreneurial firm and CA firm— to
capture salient firm-level characteristics.
Mobility is defined as the cumulative count of
inventors hired from a given source firm by a recip-
ient firm over the preceding five years, as measured
by the application year of a mobile inventor’s first
patent at the recipient organization. To determine
mobility events, we implement the matching algo-
rithm described in the Appendix to create inven-
tor patenting and employment histories at focal
firms within our sample. For 28,123 unique inven-
tor names listed in patents awarded to sample
firms, the algorithm yields 1,166 mobility events,
of which 841 originate at California-based firms.12
Inventors are present in the data for 2.2 years on
average, measured as the difference between the
first and last patent application date. For 51,615
dyads over a 30-year time window, the mobil-
ity rate is approximately 0.08 percent per dyad-
year. This estimate is slightly higher than the 0.05
percent mobility rate reported in Rosenkopf and
Almeida (2003); the difference could be due to our
inclusion of more recent data, given an increasing
trend in turnover among college-educated electri-
cal engineers (Kim and Marschke, 2005). Other
recent studies report mobility rates in the range of
one to two percent per inventor-year (Fallick et al.,
2006; Tzabbar et al., 2006). On an inventor-year
basis, our estimates are similar, at 1.88 percent.
Litigiousness is a time-varying measure based
on the observed enforcement of a source firm’s
exclusionary rights to patent-protected technolo-
gies. We measure litigiousness using a five-year
cumulative count of the number of unique patent
infringement lawsuits launched by a source firm
between 1973 and a focal observation year.13 Legal
12 Labor markets in California appear to be unusually localized
relative to those in other states. Seventy-three percent of mobile
inventors from California firms accept reemployment at another
semiconductor firm within the same consolidated statistical area
(CSA). This pattern reflects the work of Angel (1989), who
traces career histories of semiconductor engineers and finds
that 78 percent of mobile engineers remained in Silicon Valley.
In contrast, only 12 percent of inventors in our sample from
firms outside of California stay within their CSA, with 55
percent accepting reemployment at semiconductor firms with
headquarters in California.
13 Our results are robust to several alternative measures for
litigiousness; we choose to report the five-year measure for
disputes over patents often involve multiple suits
and countersuits between parties, and a given
dispute may appear multiple times in the data
because of simple changes in venue. To provide
a more conservative estimate, we screen out such
duplicative listings. For example, if three lawsuits
involving Intel suing Broadcom for patent infringe-
ment are reported in 2000, the dispute is counted
only once as a litigious action that year by Intel.
Since we are interested in devising a firm-specific
proxy for taking litigious action, we also exclude
instances in which a firm is defending against law-
suits filed by others. To capture reputation effects
at the corporate level, we measure the litigious
activity of a source firm against all defendants
rather than against a particular recipient.
A firm (whether recipient or source) is consid-
ered to be entrepreneurial if it is public, small, or
young in a focal citation year; otherwise it is con-
sidered to be established. If a firm is listed on the
New York or NASDAQ stock exchanges, we code
it as public (else, private). While we control for
size using a continuous measurement, we define
a firm as small if it has less than 100 employ-
ees in a given year, which corresponds to the 60th
percentile of the size distribution (else, large). A
firm is defined as young for the first five years
after founding (else, old). The results are robust to
alternative cutoffs at 500 employees and 12 years
for size and age.
Finally, the dummy CA source firm is set to
one if a firm has headquarters in California. Infor-
mation about headquarters location was compiled
from several sources, including Hoovers, Compu-
stat, and VentureOne. Of the 129 source firms in
the estimation sample, 80 are headquartered in Cal-
ifornia. The majority of firms’ inventive activities
occur in their headquarters’ states. For the median
California-based company, almost 90 percent of
inventors list California as the state of primary res-
idence. The percentage is somewhat lower (∼70%)
several reasons. A simple indicator variable identifying whether
a source firm had initiated a patent infringement suit by a
focal year of citation implicitly treats firms filing one and
numerous lawsuits as equally tough. A cumulative count of
patent infringement lawsuits initiated by the firm in the sample
period gives the same weight to very early and more recent
lawsuits and permits no potential erosion of the reputational
signaling value of old lawsuits over time. Any assignment of
weights over time may seem ad hoc. Restricting attention to a
five-year window preceding a focal year of citation not only
improves the predictive power of our models, but also provides
a measure that allows reputation stocks to evolve slowly while
still being prone to some decay.
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for firms headquartered in other states, which pre-
sumably reflects the fact that semiconductor firms
from other states often locate some R&D activity
in California, in part to gain access to engineering
talent and know-how.
Control variables
As do prior researchers, we include controls for
firm- and dyad-level factors shown to affect cita-
tion behavior in general (Jaffe and Trajtenberg,
2002) and in the semiconductor industry in par-
ticular (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Song et al.
2003). For each source and recipient firm, we
include the following time-varying variables: age
is defined as year t minus the founding year; log
patent stock is a count of patents awarded to a firm
in a year t, measured as a log because of skewness;
log employee is the number of employees in year
t, also measured as a log;14 log citability is the
number of citations a firm receives from all other
sample firms in a year t; and, following Rosenkopf
and Almeida (2003), we used the citability mea-
sure to control for the overall quality of a firm’s
patent portfolio.
We also include the following dyad-level char-
acteristics: alliances measures the moving sum of
the alliances formed between the firms in a dyad
over the last five years, including the focal year
(using other forms of cumulative counts had no
effect on the results). Absent this control, cita-
tions could reflect flows of knowledge mediated by
market transactions rather than residual spillovers
between firms (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong,
1998). Like prior researchers, we record the entire
range of alliances, including marketing, licens-
ing, design, manufacturing, and equity. When an
alliance involved more than two firms, we record
each alliance separately within dyads. In total, we
identified 1,168 collaborative agreements between
firms, including 199 from SDC Platinum and an
additional 969 reported in news articles and press
14 For public firms, the few missing annual employee counts are
imputed from the data reported for the most proximate year.
For private firms, employee counts are available only for the
last financing rounds reported in VentureOne. Though time-
invariant, employee counts for private firms are generally an
order of magnitude smaller than those for public firms. In unre-
ported regressions, we obtain similar results when (a) removing
observations with imputed employee counts from the sample
and (b) measuring firm size in the baseline model as log(assets)
rather than log(employees). The latter restriction drops dyad-year
observations for missing asset values.
releases obtained from Factiva and Lexis-Nexis.
Following Jaffe (1989), we measure technological
proximity as the angular separation between nor-
malized vectors based on the distribution of patents
awarded to source and recipient firms across U.S.
patent classes. Geographic match is set to one
when both firms in a dyad have headquarters in
the same CSA, according to the 2000 U.S. Census
classification. Finally, we include period dummies
for the following intervals: pre–1980, 1980–1984,
1985–1989, 1990–1994, and 1995–1999. The
omitted category is 2000–2003. The period dum-
mies allow the baseline citation rate to increase
over time (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) and also
control for macroeconomic conditions that could
affect the patenting and citation levels in the
industry.15
Summary statistics
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary and correlation
statistics for our variables for dyad-year observa-
tions. The number of observations varies consid-
erably among the dyads; pairs of long-standing
firms have more observations than pairs involv-
ing a long-standing firm and a start-up. Figure 1
plots the annual numbers of patents awarded to and
patent infringement lawsuits initiated by source
firms. Figure 1 shows a spike in litigious activ-
ity in the mid-1980s, followed by a more grad-
ual upswing in patenting activity, which is con-
sistent with claims that ‘pro-patent’ U.S. institu-
tional environment shifts triggered a more aggres-
sive stance toward the acquisition and enforcement
of patents (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Bessen and
Meurer, 2006). We nonetheless observe consider-
able heterogeneity among firms in their propensi-
ties to enforce patents: while 45 percent had ini-
tiated at least one patent infringement lawsuit by
2001, the remainder had not. The two top litigants,
Intel and Texas Instruments, are large, established
firms, but age and size vary significantly among
the top 20 litigants. Approximately 60 percent of
all litigious firms are based in California. In total,
we identify 270 unique U.S. patent infringement
suits filed by source firms during 1973–2001.
15 The results are robust to two alternative measures for business
cycle effects—an annual Tobin’s q within the semiconductor
industry (from Compustat) and annual VC investments in IT
firms (from VenturXpert).
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Table 1. Variable definitions and summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean St. dev.
Dependent variables




Litigiousness Moving sum of patent litigation lawsuits over the last five years
including the given year by the cited firm.
0.579 1.987
Mobility Moving sum of mobility events from the citing to the cited firm over
the last five years including the focal year as measured by the
application year of the citing firm patent.
0.007 0.119
Dyad-level controls
Technological proximity Technological proximity between the source and recipient firms.
Calculated as angular separation between the normalized vectors
representing proportions of patents in each patent class, as per
Jaffe (1989).
0.153 0.259
Same region Dummy = 1 if cited and citing firms have headquarters in the same
consolidated statistical area (CSA).
0.251 0.434
Alliances Moving sum of alliances over the last five years including the given
year between the firms in a dyad.
0.01 0.122
Direct target Dummy = 1 if recipient firm directly targeted by lawsuit initiated by
the source firm in the focal year or in the past; 0 otherwise.
0.0015 0.039
Firm-level controls
Age (recipient) Recipient firm age: focal year-founding year. 10.202 10.709
Log employees (recipient) Log of the number of employees in a focal year. Time invariant for
firms from the VentureOne database. Missing data filled in using
the first and last record available (see text).
4.993 1.675
Log patent stock (recipient) Log of the number of patents the recipient firm received in a focal
year, as measured by the application year. Patents of acquired
firms are counted starting with acquisition year +1.
0.805 1.160
Log patent stock (source) Analogous to log patent stock (recipient). 1.089 1.420
Log citability (source) Log of the number of citations the source firm received from all
sample firms within the preceding five years, as measured by the
application year.
0.966 1.541
Age (source) Source firm age: focal year-founding year. 16.313 12.205
Log employees (source) Analogous to log size (recipient) 5.913 1.682
Subgroups
Entrepreneurial recipient Dummy = 1 if, in focal year, recipient firm is privately owned OR
has 100 or fewer employees OR is less than five years old (based
on founding year); 0 otherwise
0.69 0.462
Entrepreneurial source Dummy = 1 if, in focal year, source firm is privately owned OR has
100 or fewer employees OR is less than five years old (based on
founding year); 0 otherwise
0.36 0.481




Since the dependent variable is the number of cita-
tions that a recipient firm makes to patents owned
by a focal source firm in a given year, we use count
data models. Following Rosenkopf and Almeida
(2003), we first estimate negative binomial regres-
sions, which are used when conditional variance
exceeds the conditional mean. A likelihood-ratio
test refutes the hypothesis of no overdispersion
(p<0.001) in our sample. We allow for nonin-
dependence of dyad-year observations and use
error terms that are robust to heteroskedasticity.16
Alternative models (zero-inflated negative bino-
mial models and Poisson models with robust vari-
ance matrix) generated qualitatively similar results.
16 Clustering errors by dyads yields identical results.
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Infringement suits Patents awarded
Figure 1. Annual # of U.S. patent infringement suits initiated by source firms vs. the annual # of U.S. patents they
received, 1973–2001
By using control variables and estimation meth-
ods common in prior citation-based studies of
knowledge spillovers, we first establish a base-
line estimate of the propensity of one firm to cite
patents owned by another. We then introduce IP
toughness and its interaction with inventor mobil-
ity, the key variables of interest in our study, and
further test for heterogeneous effects on different
types of firms. Importantly, we conduct robust-
ness tests related to (a) our use of patent citations
as a proxy for knowledge diffusion, and (b) the
assumption of strict exogeneity of the key explana-
tory variables of interest, as discussed in detail
below.
RESULTS
To test Hypothesis 1, we examine whether the
interaction effect of mobility and litigiousness is
negative and significant (Table 3). To test Hypo-
theses 2 and 3, we use a Wald test for differ-
ences in coefficients among the relevant subgroups
within a seemingly unrelated regression framework
(Table 4). Results of the baseline specification,
reported in Column 1, Table 3, are consistent with
prior work. The baseline citation rate is higher
between firms that are technologically and geo-
graphically proximate; it also is higher between
alliance partners and firms that hire away employ-
ees. Larger firms and firms with larger portfolios
of patents tend to receive a higher baseline num-
ber of citations from a given recipient, as do firms
with patents that receive higher citations more gen-
erally (thus suggesting that the baseline number of
citations received by firms with more ‘important’
patents is higher than that of firms with less influ-
ential patents). Column 2 of Table 3 introduces
the litigiousness variable, which is positive and
significant, while Column 3 adds the interaction
term of focal interest (litigiousness × mobility).
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on
litigiousness × mobility is negative and signifi-
cant. The average marginal effect of the interac-
tion is −0.18, and this effect is significant at the
0.05 level for 99 percent of the observations in
the sample. These results suggest that even though
litigious firms have patents that are highly cited,
they are built upon less extensively by firms that
hire their employees than otherwise would be pre-
dicted. For each additional lawsuit filed by a source
firm, the citation count is lower by 0.18 for a firm
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Table 4. Subgroup analyses for entrepreneurial and California-based firms†

















Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main variables
Litigiousness ∗ mobility −0.051∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.063 −0.051∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
Litigiousness (source) 0.047∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.001
Dyad-level controls
Technological proximity 3.526∗∗∗ 3.473∗∗∗ 3.580∗∗∗ 3.290∗∗∗ 3.466∗∗∗ 3.716∗∗∗
Same region 0.172∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗
Alliances 0.163∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ −0.093
Mobility 0.520∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
Firm-level controls
Age (recipient) −0.019∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.014∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
Log employees
(recipient)
−0.294∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
Log patent stock
(recipient)
1.130∗∗∗ 1.617∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗ 1.311∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗
Log patent stock (source) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.054 0.099∗∗ 0.219∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗
Log citability (source) 0.225∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
Age (source) 0.0003 0.017∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.002
Log employees (source) 0.345∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.05 0.250∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
Constant −7.208∗∗∗ −9.891∗∗∗ −9.222∗∗∗ −7.793∗∗∗ −8.597∗∗∗ −9.920∗∗∗
Log likelihood −27,755 −16,165 −40,307 −4,242 −29,865 −14,730
Unit of analysis dyad-year dyad-year dyad-year dyad-year dyad-year dyad-year
# observations 156,671 349,703 321,616 184,758 305009 201365
Wald test statistic χ 2(1) 7∗∗∗ 0.02 0.42
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Note: All models include time period dummies as defined in the text.
† Entrepreneurial firms are defined as firms that have less than 100 employees, or are less than five years old, or are private in
a focal year of observation; else, firms are considered to be more established. California firms are headquartered in California;
‘non-California’ firms are headquartered in other U.S. states.
that has hired an inventor relative to a firm that
has not.
In Columns 4–7 of Table 3, we test the robust-
ness of this core finding in our study in several
ways. First, we reestimate the model after exclud-
ing examiner-added citations for patents awarded
since 2001 for which such data are available. As
shown in Column 4, there is little evidence that
biases introduced from examiner-added citations
spuriously drive our results. The litigiousness ×
mobility coefficient remains negative and highly
significant irrespective of whether examiner-added
citations are included or removed from the depen-
dent variable.
Next, we investigate a more fundamental issue
regarding model specification. While the negative
binomial model specification allows us to build
cumulatively upon and replicate the results in prior
work on learning-by-hiring (e.g., Rosenkopf and
Almeida, 2003; Almeida et al., 2003), the under-
lying assumption of strict exogeneity of key vari-
ables of interest may be particularly strong in
the context of our study. Importantly, a firm’s
prior litigiousness as well as other unobserved
characteristics could affect not only citations con-
ditional on job changes among inventors, but
also the underlying distribution of employees who
decide to switch jobs. Further, the use of vari-
ables based on cumulative counts violates the strict
exogeneity assumption of the standard count esti-
mation methods (Wooldridge, 1997). To test if
our results are sensitive to these potential issues,
we employ an instrumental variable approach rec-
ommended by Wooldridge (1997), and use the
generalized method of moments (GMM) esti-
mation method, which permits the inclusion of
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explanatory variables correlated with past and cur-
rent values of the error term. We estimate the
GMM models using the GAUSS routine ‘ExpEnd’
of Windmeijer (2002) and moment conditions
based on quasi-differencing (Wooldridge, 1997).17
To correct for time-invariant heterogeneity in each
dyad, we define the panel using the dyad-level
fixed effects. Since within-unit changes must be
observed over time for effects to be estimated, the
number of observations drops accordingly. First,
we correct for violation of the strict exogene-
ity assumption resulting from use of cumulative
counts by using lagged variables as instruments.
In Column 5 of Table 3, we instrumented mobil-
ity, litigiousness, and alliances (and the relevant
interaction terms) using their one- and two-year
lagged values. As Wooldridge (1997) discusses,
this approach relaxes the strict exogeneity assump-
tion of a negative binomial model by relying on
weaker sequential moment restriction. Importantly,
the coefficient on litigiousness × mobility in Col-
umn 5 remains negative and highly significant.
Indeed, the estimated magnitude of the coefficient
is larger when we use lagged values as instruments
to relax the strict exogeneity assumption.
Second, in Column 6 of Table 3, we employ an
even more stringent specification by fully instru-
menting mobility with an exogenous inventor-
level differences variable rather than lagged values.
Following Kim and Marsche (2005), we instru-
ment mobility using the annual percentage of each
source firm’s inventors who are female (percent-
age female).18 The logic behind this instrument is
straightforward: the ratio of women inventors is
likely to be correlated with exit decisions (women
tend to be less mobile) and is also likely to be
uncorrelated with unobserved quality differences.
17 The nonlinear GMM estimates (based on Wooldridge’s (1997)


















from Windmeijer (2000), where W is the weighting matrix, Z
is the instrument matrix, and s is Wooldridge’s quasi-difference.
Unfortunately, as Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) discuss, there
is no ‘weakness test for instruments’ available for nonlin-
ear GMM.
18 To compile this variable, we created a dummy variable man-
ually coded one for ‘female’ on the basis of the first names of
inventors listed on patents in our sample. For each source firm,
we then divided the total number of female inventors by the
total number of inventors at the source firm in a focal year, thus
allowing the percentage to change over time.
As seen in Column 6 in Table 3, the fully instru-
mented litigiousness × mobility remains negative
and highly significant.
Finally, we note that in our theory, reputation
for toughness is a corporate-level construct. In
the final column of Table 3, we investigate an
alternative explanation for our Hypothesis 1 find-
ings. If IP toughness reduces the spillover asso-
ciated with employee mobility only between firms
directly involved in legal conflict, our results could
be explained by dyad-level dynamics rather than
broader reputation effects within the industry. If
this alternative explanation is correct, litigiousness
× mobility should become statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, or drop sharply in magnitude
once we control for dyad-level litigation. To test
this possibility, we constructed a new variable,
direct target, which is set to one if a given recipi-
ent firm has been sued for patent infringement by a
given source firm by a focal year of citation.19 We
also created the interaction term direct target ×
mobility to permit assessment of differences in the
effect of litigiousness on mobility-driven spillovers
between litigating and nonlitigating dyads. Col-
umn 7, Table 3, reports results that add these two
variables to our main model in Column 3. Impor-
tantly, the coefficient on litigiousness × mobility
remains highly significant and similar in magni-
tude even after we take into account the dynamics
introduced by actual legal conflict between dyads.
These results provide corroborating evidence that
litigation acts shape the behavior of hiring orga-
nizations more broadly within the industry, even
absent the filing of an actual lawsuit, as reputation-
based theories would predict.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the estimates reported
in Column 7 suggest that the effects of IP tough-
ness are amplified for firms directly involved in
legal conflict. The positive and significant coeffi-
cient on direct target indicates that recipient firms
have a higher propensity to cite patents owned
by source firms that have directly sued them for
patent infringement. Legal conflict could result
in settlements that give recipient firms greater
access to patent-protected technologies owned by
focal source firms in our sample, thus increasing
citation counts at the dyad level. Alternatively,
19 We are grateful to a reviewer for this valuable suggestion.
Of the 270 unique patent infringement suits initiated by source
firms, 113 (42%) are against recipient firms in the sample. Most
out-of-sample disputes are filed against non-U.S. firms or firms
in other industries.
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source firms may be more likely to sue recipi-
ent firms that are disproportionate beneficiaries of
knowledge spillovers emanating from their orga-
nizations, thus resulting in a positive correlation
between observed legal conflict and recipient firm
citations to source firm patents. For the purposes
of our study, it is more relevant to observe that
between litigating dyads, IP toughness reduces the
spillovers associated with inventor mobility events.
In fact, comparing coefficient estimates on liti-
giousness × mobility and direct target × mobility
(−0.057 and −1.095, respectively), the deterrent
effect of IP rights enforcement on spillovers in
labor markets is greater when the costly filing of
an actual lawsuit accompanies it.20
In summary, Table 3 provides evidence that IP
litigiousness moderates the extent to which recip-
ient firms learn by hiring inventors from industry
rivals. We find little evidence that biases intro-
duced by examiner-added citations or endogeneity
concerns about our variables of interest spuriously
affect our results. Finally, our results are consistent
with the view that IP toughness casts a shadow
over behavior in the semiconductor industry as
a whole rather than merely behavior confined to
pairs of firms directly involved in legal conflict.
We now turn to Table 4, reporting our subgroup
analyses and corresponding tests for Hypothe-
ses 2a and 2b (on heterogeneity among firms)
and Hypothesis 3 (on California-specific effects).
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 present evidence con-
sistent with Hypothesis 2a: IP toughness will deter
spillovers to a greater degree for hiring organi-
zations that are entrepreneurial rather than estab-
lished. While litigiousness × mobility is nega-
tive and significant for both established (Column
1) and entrepreneurial (Column 2) recipients, the
magnitude of the effect for entrepreneurial recip-
ients is about double that for their more estab-
lished counterparts. More specifically, the impact
of the interaction effect on citations is a decrease
by about five percent for established recipients
and 10 percent for entrepreneurial recipients with
each litigation and mobility event. The Wald test
20 Robustness checks not formally reported here test a second
alternative explanation: hiring inventors from more litigious
firms induces recipient firms to keep a greater share of their
subsequent innovations secret as opposed to seeking patents.
We find little evidence of a decline in the propensity of recipient
firms to patent after a mobility event, which is reflective of strong
pressures to file patents in this industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001;
Ziedonis, 2003)
refutes the hypothesis that the coefficients are
equivalent in the respective subgroups, thereby
supporting Hypothesis 2a. Similarly, Columns 3
and 4 of Table 4 provide evidence consistent
with Hypothesis 2b: the deterrent effects of IP
toughness will be lower for entrepreneurial source
firms than for established ones; indeed, the find-
ing is stronger than the prediction. Moreover,
the results suggest that IP toughness reduces the
spillovers associated with inventor hiring only for
relatively well-established firms. In contrast, for
less well-established source firms, the coefficient
on litigiousness × mobility is indistinguishable
from zero. An absence of litigation initiated by
entrepreneurial source firms does not appear to
drive the latter finding; roughly 10 percent of the
total patent infringement lawsuits are initiated by
small, young, or private firms.21
Finally, we predict in Hypothesis 3 that IP
toughness will have a less deterrent effect on
employee mobility–related spillovers for source
firms based in California than for firms based
in other U.S. states. The subgroup analysis for
Hypothesis 3 is reported in Columns 5 and 6 of
Table 4. Overall, the coefficient on litigiousness
× mobility remains negative and significant at
the one percent level for source firms irrespective
of state. While the magnitude of the coefficient
is slightly smaller for California-based firms (at
−0.05) than for others (at −0.06), the Wald test
fails to refute the null hypothesis that the effects
are statistically equivalent in size. At odds with
our Hypothesis 3 prediction, we therefore fail to
find that coefficient of litigiousness × mobility
is significantly different for California and non-
California firms. As a robustness check, we divided
21 In an unreported analysis (available upon request), we explore
finer-grained asymmetries between source and recipient firms.
The results largely mirror those reported in Columns 1 and
2 of Table 4. IP toughness reduces employee mobility–related
spillovers to a greater extent when the relative difference in
resource constraints is large: established source firms are more
effective against entrepreneurial recipients than are established
recipients, while entrepreneurial source firms are ineffective
against established recipients but effective against entrepreneurial
recipients. Further, we tested for differential effects of IP tough-
ness for employee entrepreneurship. We included a dummy vari-
able spin-out if the mobility event represented the founding of
a new firm by the employee, as well as its interaction with liti-
giousness. The results are similar to those for the direct target
analysis: the coefficient of spin-out is positive and significant
(spin-outs cite the source firm to a greater extent), and the coef-
ficient of litigiousness × spin-out is negative and significant
(spin-outs cite litigious firms less than other hiring recipients).
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the source firm sample into ‘Silicon Valley’ and
‘non–Silicon Valley’ and obtained similar results.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Don’t let your employees do to you what you did
to your former boss!
-Roger Borovoy, former general counsel, Intel
(Jackson, 1997: 214).
Although job hopping by engineers and sci-
entists is widely heralded as a vibrant channel
for knowledge transfer, little is known about the
actions firms take to reduce knowledge outflows
through markets for skilled labor. Assuming that
employee moves to rival firms impose a negative
externality on source firms and that contractual and
other legal mechanisms provide imperfect solu-
tions, this study investigates the effectiveness of
a lever that has received little attention in prior
research—a reputation for tough enforcement of
intellectual property rights. In doing so, we shed
new light on the strategies firms use to capture
value from their innovation-related investments.
Drawing on a uniquely rich database of patent
lawsuits, inventor mobility events, and patent cita-
tions in the U.S. semiconductor industry over three
decades, we find (in support of Hypothesis 1)
that a firm’s patent litigiousness significantly cur-
tails the outward dissemination of technological
knowledge that otherwise would be expected from
employee departures. These findings are consistent
with the view that filing a patent lawsuit—a costly
and observable action—serves a sorting function
whereby tough employers can be credibly sepa-
rated from their passive counterparts. Such evi-
dence of past litigiousness sends a strong signal
to third parties (whether employees or their poten-
tial hirers), thus shaping their behavior. Building
on earlier work on strategic deterrence and preda-
tion, this study shows how corporate reputations
for toughness can be valuable to firms seeking to
deter unauthorized transfers of proprietary knowl-
edge through employee exits.
Our results further suggest that the costs and
distractions associated with IP enforcement may
affect both the precautions firms take to ‘avoid the
shadows’ of litigious firms and the credence others
in the industry place in threats of litigious action.
Consistently with Hypothesis 2a, our estimates
suggest that corporate reputations for toughness are
particularly powerful in curbing knowledge out-
flows to entrepreneurial firms. An important impli-
cation of this finding is that entrepreneurial firms,
which prior studies have shown stand to gain most
from hiring skilled workers from established firms
(Almeida et al., 2003; Agarwal et al, 2004), are
disproportionately affected by tough reputations
of industry incumbents. We also find, consistently
with Hypothesis 2b, that IP toughness reduces
mobility-driven spillovers less when source firms
are young, small, or private than when they are
more established. While entrepreneurial firms are
widely viewed as an important source of ‘cre-
ative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942) because of
their innovations, these findings collectively under-
score the hurdles that these firms may face when
introducing technologies that may disrupt market
leaders. These findings contribute new evidence
to that offered by a handful of studies exploring
how the high costs of patent enforcement may
tilt advantage toward firms with superior resource
endowments (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Lerner,
2001; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). From a
policy perspective, these results suggest that cur-
rent initiatives to lower the costs of adjudicating
patent rights in the United States may warrant seri-
ous consideration, as Lemley and Shapiro (2005)
and others discuss. Otherwise, the costs and uncer-
tainties of IP-related conflicts may redirect innova-
tive activity toward more established, resource-rich
organizations.
Finally, we hypothesized that an environment
that fosters entrepreneurial activity in technology-
based industries, such as that of Silicon Valley
and California overall, reduces the impact of IP
litigiousness on knowledge spillover via employee
mobility. Empirically, we find little evidence that
reputations for patent litigiousness are less effec-
tive as a spillover-reduction mechanism for semi-
conductor firms headquartered in California than
they are for firms headquartered in other states.
The lack of supporting evidence for this prediction
has important implications, both for firm strategy
and for government policy. From a strategic per-
spective, the nonfinding highlights the intriguing
possibility that, when seeking to reduce leakage
of proprietary know-how from employee depar-
tures, firms may be able to partially compensate
for poor environmental support by enacting aggres-
sive strategies that build on firm-level capabili-
ties. When firms confront weak state laws gov-
erning employment contracts, they can leverage
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federal policies governing IP protection, which
have strengthened considerably over the past few
decades (Jaffe, 2000). The public policy implica-
tions are not obvious. To the extent that aggressive
IP enforcement helps reduce knowledge spillovers
via employee mobility, firms may have greater
incentives to invest in human capital and R&D.
By increasing the market power of employers over
mobile workers, the pro-patent shift in U.S. poli-
cies helped stimulate investments in on-the-job
training and R&D projects of value to other firms
in an industry. In this view, our study suggests
that broader research on human capital investments
(e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999) may be
fruitfully informed by paying greater attention to
the role of firm-level IP strategies. At the same
time, however, the vitality of innovative regions
such as Silicon Valley is widely attributed to active
job hopping by skilled workers and the correspond-
ing diffusion of technological know-how and dis-
coveries across firm boundaries (Saxenian, 1994;
Gilson, 1999). If reputations for IP toughness curb
the interfirm dissemination of technological knowl-
edge, particularly to start-ups, regional dynamics
could be threatened.
Limitations and future research
Both the limitations and the findings of the study
present avenues for future research. First, while
the semiconductor industry is a canonical context
for examining research questions such as ours, the
present findings may be limited in generalizability
by our single-industry focus. In theory, we expect
reputations for IP toughness to deter spillovers in
strong legal regimes and in sectors where uncom-
pensated leakage via employee exits can erode
significant investments in innovation. Following
this logic, our findings should generalize to other
pro-patent legal regimes and to other knowledge-
intensive sectors, such as biotechnology and med-
ical devices. Future research that examines other
industry contexts will be useful, particularly to
identify boundary conditions for the effectiveness
of IP toughness strategies.22 Also, there may be
22 While they do not examine reputation effects associated with
patent enforcement, Kim and Marschke (2005) provide evidence
that may be instructive for future cross-industry studies. They
find that an increase in employee turnover stimulates more
aggressive patenting by firms in high-technology industries than
in less R&D-intensive ones. Given recent developments of
cross-industry patent litigation databases (e.g., Lanjouw and
conditions under which interorganizational trans-
fers of knowledge benefit firms (e.g., see Oettl and
Agrawal, 2008), in which case a reputation for IP
toughness should hold little deterrent value. Future
studies could investigate this issue by investigating
the role of IP toughness in sectors such as software,
where success often hinges on rapid adoption and
use by others.
Second, although we use ‘IP rights enforcement’
and ‘patent enforcement’ interchangeably in the
study, our focus on patents does not account for the
alternative mechanisms (i.e., trade secrets, nondis-
closure agreements, noncompete agreements in
employment contracts, copyrights, trademarks)
available to firms for protecting their technological
know-how. For instance, von Graevenitz (2007)
finds that past aggressive protection of trademarks
increases the likelihood of current disputes being
settled speedily. An interesting avenue for future
research is whether litigiousness over other legal
forms of IP rights reinforces corporate reputa-
tions for toughness gained through patent enforce-
ment. If that were true, the magnitude of effects
reported in this study would be understated. Sim-
ilarly, our study focuses only on the effects of
IP toughness on a single channel of knowledge
transfer—employee mobility. Future research that
examines alternative strategies for building reputa-
tions for IP toughness and compares the efficacy of
such strategies in multiple channels of knowledge
transfer (i.e., alliances, vicarious learning, reverse
engineering) will greatly enhance our understand-
ing of the boundary conditions on value appropri-
ation (Agarwal et al., 2007).
Third, since our empirical analysis hinged on the
use of patent data to identify mobility events, our
observations are necessarily restricted to instances
in which an inventor was identified on patents
assigned to more than one firm in our sample.
Missing from the sample, therefore, are instances
in which the mobile employee had minor involve-
ment or only general awareness of a technol-
ogy. Similarly, our study does not capture actions
related to technologies that were in the initial
stages of development but not patented prior to
the employee departure. However, there is no a
priori reason to expect that a reputation for IP
Schankerman, 2001, 2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2006), future
studies could investigate the differences in the magnitude of
effects among sectors.
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toughness would affect knowledge transfer asso-
ciated with noninventor mobility differently from
how it affects transfer via inventor mobility.
Fourth, while our results are robust to alterna-
tive measures of litigiousness, our study naturally
invites further investigation of the following ques-
tions: How should a firm build a reputation of
toughness? For instance, as mentioned in our intro-
duction, Intel’s CEO initiated a strategy of filing
two IP suits per quarter. Is such repetition particu-
larly powerful? Or is one strong and highly visible
aggressive action sufficient? Similarly, do reputa-
tions for toughness need to be maintained once
they are built? Our robustness checks indicated
some erosion of IP toughness reputation over time,
in that the five-year litigiousness measure outper-
forms the proxy based on total cumulative counts.
More generally, little is known about whether or
how much the time required to build (or lose)
corporate reputation is domain-specific or simi-
lar across activities. Are reputations for toughness
about IP rights quicker to build (and slower to
erode) than reputations for goodness in product
markets or in the environmental and other social
responsibility arenas? Future research examining
the cost-benefit trade-offs for building alternative
forms of reputation can help shed light on these
questions.
Fifth, our findings for the moderating effect
of IP toughness on knowledge spillover through
employee mobility have important implications for
issues relating to individuals’ decisions to join
or leave organizations and their behavior during
employment. Examining this interwoven set of
issues is beyond the current scope. A resulting
limitation of the study is that we do not explic-
itly model the potential effects of IP toughness
on employee decisions to enter or exit an orga-
nization (and the corresponding incentives and
motives of potential hiring organizations). Under-
standing the longer-term consequences of reputa-
tion for IP toughness for employee recruitment,
incentives, and retention is an important avenue
for future research. For instance, the immediate
effect of a tough reputation may be to reduce
employee exit, thus reducing transfer of knowl-
edge. However, such a reputation may also influ-
ence the decisions of employees to disclose novel
ideas to their employers (Anton and Yao, 1995),
thus adversely affecting the development of new
knowledge within organizational boundaries. In the
longer term, aggressive IP enforcement may alter
the ability of an organization to hire skilled labor.
Moen (2005) and Franco and Filson (2006) find
that individuals with entrepreneurial aspirations
often accept a pay cut to apprentice for the ‘best’
firms. Given our findings that entrepreneurial firms
are relatively disadvantaged in the realm of liti-
gious behavior, such individuals may be reluctant
to join a firm reputed to be tough if doing so
appears to curtail opportunity for future advance-
ment outside the firm’s boundaries. Thus, if a
tough reputation makes it more difficult or costly
to attract key talent, or triggers an exodus of star
inventors, a firm may ‘win the battle, but lose
the war’ by adopting a litigious stance toward
proprietary knowledge. Similarly, the trade-offs
between IP ‘toughness’ and rewards-based systems
(e.g., use of bonuses, stock options, and/or vest-
ment periods) remain unaddressed in this study.
This naturally invites continued research with a
more ‘general equilibrium’ approach examining
the effect of various strategies that firms may
employ to attract and retain inventive employ-
ees while at the same time restricting leakage of
knowledge through employee exit.
Finally, our study opens up interesting avenues
for continued research on ‘learning by hiring’ and
more generally, ‘make-or buy’ decisions for inven-
tive talent: Why do firms risk litigation through
‘learning-by-hiring’ when they could conceivably
develop knowledge in-house? What are the costs
and benefits of the ‘learning-by-risking litigation’
strategy? We hope that our study will trigger addi-
tional research that examines the costs and trade-
offs faced by recipient firms as well.
Contributions
These limitations notwithstanding, our study makes
several important contributions. Prior studies of
knowledge spillovers through employee mobil-
ity (e.g., Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf
and Almeida, 2003; Song et al., 2003) implic-
itly assume a passive role for source firms in the
process by which knowledge diffuses across firm
boundaries. By relaxing this implicit assumption,
we contribute to a nascent stream of research on
the mechanisms firms use to safeguard against the
inadvertent leakage of know-how and proprietary
technologies. In addition to ‘keeping a distance’
from key rivals when entering foreign countries
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(Alcacer and Chung, 2007), altering the composi-
tion of inventive teams (Zhao, 2006), and enforc-
ing noncompete agreements in employment con-
tracts (Gilson, 1999; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003;
Marx et al., 2009), we show that firms engage
in reputation building by enforcing legal rights to
intellectual property.
The study also builds on and extends the liter-
ature on reputation effects in corporate strategy.
Although much recent work emphasizes the bene-
fits of being ‘good’—either as a socially respon-
sible corporate citizen or as a high-quality pro-
ducer (see Roberts and Dowling, 2002)—earlier
studies highlight the reputational benefits of being
tough or aggressive (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1982). Our study shows that
insights from such strategic interaction models
of competitive dynamics in product markets can
also inform the interplay between an employer’s
IP litigiousness and employee-driven expropria-
tion risk. Just as a reputation for predatory pricing
may enhance monopoly advantage by curtailing
entry, so may a reputation for aggressive initiation
of patent infringement lawsuits limit knowledge
transfer through a key conduit: mobile employees.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the
first to provide systematic evidence on this issue,
reinforcing impressions drawn from anecdotal evi-
dence.
Finally, in the literature on IP litigation, prior
studies show that firms are more likely to enforce
economically valuable patents (e.g., Lanjouw and
Schankerman, 2004; Allison et al., 2004) and to
be litigious when the strategic stakes are higher
(Somaya, 2003). By casting IP enforcement as a
broader reputation-building strategy that is salient
to employer-employee dynamics, we add new
insights to this literature. In this respect, our study
is perhaps most similar in spirit to recent work
by Kim and Marschke (2005) emphasizing patents
as protecting firms from expropriation by insiders
who leave to join rival firms or to start new com-
panies. While Kim and Marschke (2005) find that
firms file for patent protection more aggressively
when faced with increased employee turnover,
they do not consider the added reputation effects
that accrue through patent enforcement. Spillover
deterrence through labor market channels can be
viewed as an added benefit of being litigious
more generally. By credibly signaling that it is
aggressive, a firm may reap indirect reputational
benefits even from disputes propelled by broader
motives. Our study also provides new evidence
on how the high costs associated with IP lit-
igation can differentially affect the behavior of
entrepreneurial and established firms, thus con-
tributing to prior research on this important topic
(Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001; Lan-
jouw and Schankerman, 2001).
In conclusion, we theorize and demonstrate that
corporate reputations for tough enforcement of
intellectual property rights significantly influence
the knowledge spillovers that occur when employ-
ees leave to join rivals or form new companies of
their own. Such reputations have a stronger effect
on knowledge transfers to entrepreneurial firms
than on those to established firms, and are equally
effective for firms located inside and those located
outside an institutional domain known to foster
interfirm knowledge exchanges. The study sheds
new light on the strategic levers firms use to pre-
vent rivals from capturing value from their invest-
ments in human capital and R&D, and reveals
promising pathways for continued research.
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY FOR
MATCHING INVENTOR NAMES
We match the patent inventor records using the
following procedure. First, we aggregate inventors
on the patents assigned to the firms using exact
match on the first and last name within each
firm.23 Next, we generate two subsets: the first
uses the last patent associated with that inventor
at the source firm; the second uses the first patent
associated with that inventor at each recipient.
We then match the two sets against each other
using exact match on the first and last names. All
matches that occur following an acquisition by one
firm of another are omitted, which removes about
15 percent of the observations. Put differently, if
inventor X patents at firm A in 1997 and at firm B
in 1998 and B acquires A in 1997, the observation
is not treated as a mobility event.
If middle initials are the same, a match is
recorded; if they are different, the event is dis-
carded. Thus, the letter ‘M’ and the name ‘Michael’
would be treated as a match on middle initial
whereas the letter ‘M’ and the name ‘John’ would
not. If one or both of the records have missing
middle initials, the record is flagged and matched
23 Using the exact match appears as a robust and parsimonious
way to generate matches. Complete manual match on a subset of
the data revealed that misspellings and different name versions
on first and last names account for less than two percent
of the actual mobility events—type I error. The differences
in the middle initial account for about three percent of the
events, but such events are correctly recorded by our procedure.
We also discovered that using fuzzy match on the first and
last names would dramatically increase the amount of false
matches—type II error—excessively increasing the burden on
the manual cleaning.
manually using other criteria like geographical
proximity, metropolitan density, and common
name frequency. For instance, John Smith is less
likely to be a match to any other John Smith
than Vladimir Rumennik to Vladimir Rumennik.
As discussed by Trajtenberg, Shiff, and Melamed
(2006), the likelihood of a match is amplified in
small metropolitan areas and over small distances.
Finally, we impose the rule that the applica-
tion date of the last patent for a given inventor
in a source firm must precede the application date
of that inventor’s first patent in a recipient firm.
To correctly recreate the movement history, each
event is matched against the first possible move.24
The events are then manually cleaned for patent
coassignments (patent may be assigned to both
source and target firm at the same time; we have
50 such occurrences in our sample) and concurrent
patenting at more than one assignee (appearing as
moving back and forth between the firms). Any
instances where the same inventor appears at more
than one assignee at the same time or any ques-
tionable patterns (all patents at different employers
in the same year) are excluded as mobility events
and are assumed to represent two inventors with
the same name.













1 X 1/1/1999 Y 12/4/2000
2 X 1/1/1999 Z 4/22/2002
3 Y 3/5/2001 Z 4/22/2002
Only events 1 and 3 are recorded as mobility events.
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